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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal of denial of a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus ("PWHC"). Judge
Daniel Steckel never issued a writ, and it was a month before a "motion hearing" was held when
he denied the PWHC.
Windsor was restrained in his liberty for 35 days. The State violated every possible statute
in the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act ("UCEA"). Windsor was unlawfully detained,
unlawfully incarcerated, denied bond, denied all sorts of legal and Constitutional rights, and was
never afforded any of the rights that are supposed to be provided by Title 19 Chapter 45 of the
Idaho Code ("LC."). Ada County violated the UCEA and delivered Windsor to Montana.
Windsor was not a fugitive, but the State falsely claimed he was. He was never arrested.
There was never a finding of probable cause. No warrant was ever issued. There was never
even a complaint.
Windsor was allegedly charged with five alleged crimes by the State of Montana ("MT").
His "crimes" were sending a Tweet that contained the name of a man who attempted to murder
him, publishing the man's name online four times in two legal documents, sending a required
legal service document to an attorney for the University of Montana ("UM"), and filming a
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documentary exposing corruption in Missoula MT. Judge Daniel Steckel increased Windsor's
bond to $4.1 million for these "heinous" crimes.
The authority of the State ofID to protect citizens from illegal arrest or wrongful rendition
must never be forgotten. (U.S. Constitution Article 4, Section 2, Clause 2; Walton v. State,
1977, 98 Idaho 442, 566 P.2d 765.)
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

ISSUE #1: Was Windsor unlawfully restrained of his liberty?
ISSUE #2: Did the State of Idaho violate Windsor's Constitutional rights with numerous
violations of the Idaho statutes on extraditions?
ISSUE #3: Were Windsor's Constitutional rights violated?
ISSUE #4: Was Windsor's property unlawfully seized and searched?
ISSUE #5: Did the State fail to make a complaint against Windsor?
ISSUE #6: Was Windsor denied his right to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and denied
action by a judge on the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus?
ISSUE #7: Was Windsor not charged with a crime within the jurisdiction of the demanding
state?
ISSUE #8: Was there a failure to substantially charge Windsor with a crime?
ISSUE #9: Did Ada County courts fail to make timely determinations regarding Windsor?
ISSUE #9: Was Windsor wrongfully considered to be a fugitive?
ISSUE #10: Should Windsor have been released by Judge Theresa Gardunia on February 20,
2015 when there was no finding of probable cause?
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ISSUE #11: Was Windsor unlawfully held in the Ada County Idaho Jail?
ISSUE #12: Did the State fail to meet the requirements of LC. 19-4515, and was Windsor
wrongfully denied bail?
ISSUE #13: Was Windsor denied due process?
ISSUE #14: Is the lack of access to a law library in the Ada County Jail a violation of
Constitutional rights?
ISSUE #15: Was Windsor denied access to a court to seek redress of grievances?
ISSUE #16: Was the warrant insufficient in this matter?
ISSUE #17: Is there no evidence that Windsor committed any crimes?
ISSUE #18: Was Windsor subjected to cruel and unusual punishment?
ISSUE #19: Was Windsor unlawfully denied discharge pursuant to Idaho Code 19-4513?
ISSUE #20: Did the State fail to controvert the allegations in the Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus?
ISSUE #21: Did Judge Steckel fail to address the issues in denying the Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus?
ISSUE #22: Was Judge Steckel's denial of the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus not supported
by the evidence before the court?
ISSUE #23: Did Judge Steckel err by not ruling on whether Appellant was a fugitive from
Montana or Texas?
ISSUE #24: Was the alleged Idaho Governor's Warrant insufficient?
ISSUE #25: Was documentation provided by the State of Montana insufficient for extradition?
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ISSUE #26: Was the evidence insufficient to detain and deliver Windsor for trial in another
state?
ISSUE #27: Did the State fail to provide evidence that Windsor was ever served with a warrant
of any type?
ISSUE #28: Was it an error by failing to grant a Writ or issue an order denying the grant of a
writ?
ISSUE #29: Did Judge Steckel err by not giving Windsor the opportunity for review of the
alleged issuance of an Idaho Governor's Warrant?
ISSUE #30: Was Windsor denied procedural rights accorded by Idaho statute?
ISSUE #31: Should the relief requested in the petitions for writ of habeas corpus have been
granted?
ISSUE #32: Are there special considerations in this matter that justifies granting this Appeal?
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
None.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Windsor is a 67 year-old grandfather who had never been arrested, never committed a

crime, and who had never been in jail. He has not even had a traffic or parking ticket in 15
years. He pays his taxes and abides by all rules. [R VOL:1, P 000007.] (Tr VOL:2, P 7, L 6-8.)
2.

In 2006, Windsor became aware of corruption by federal judges in Georgia. He

documented the corruption every step of the way as the federal courts stripped him of his entire
life savings (over $2 million) and inflicted all types of abuse. [R VOL:l, P 000007.]

9

3.

Windsor appealed and filed a petition for writ of mandamus with the U.S. Supreme

Court. When the Supreme Court of the United States issued a decision in which it refused to tell
the federal judges in Georgia that they must abide by the U.S. Constitution, internet publicity
caused thousands to contact him to tell him their stories of wrongdoing. [R VOL:l, P 000008.]
4.

This caused Windsor to become an activist fighting corruption. [R VOL:l, P 000008.]

5.

In February 2012, Windsor planned to drive to all 50 states to film at least one victim of

corruption in each state. On June 14, 2012, her began his "Lawless America Movie Road Trip."
241 days later, he had filmed over 750 of the 6,000 who asked to be filmed. [R VOL:l, P 8, 9.]
6.

But Windsor generated many haters. The first and one of the most vicious of those

haters is a UM employee named ''Sean Boushie." [See R VOL:1, P 000009, 10, 11, and 12.]
7.

On August 23, 2013, while wrapping up filming, Windsor was served with an ex parte

Temporary Order of Protection ("TOP"). No hearing was ever held, and it expired as per its
printed terms and by statute in mid-September 2013. Windsor never did anything that would
violate the terms of the TOP, even after it expired. [R VOL:1, P 000012.]
8.

Windsor left MT on August 25, 2013 after filming a story in Great Falls. He never

returned to MT. He began living in Dallas, TX on August 31, 2013. [R VOL:1, P 000012, 13.]
9.

On December 26, 2013, Windsor filed a civil action in Ellis County ("ECty") TX

against Sean Boushie, 16 other names defendants, and 1,000 Doe defendants. Boushie and his
fellow gang members have published 400 defamatory articles about Windsor, with over 40,000
published comments, have set up dozens of hate web pages, produced over 50 hate videos, and
much more. They have claimed Windsor is guilty of a wide variety of crimes, is a pedophile, is
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incompetent in his work, has a wide variety of STDs, has a plan to kill every government official
in America, is a sexual deviant, is a terrorist, and on and on. [R VOL: 1, P 13, 14.]
10. On October 28, 2014, Windsor attended a hearing in Case #88611 in ECty TX,
Windsor v. Joeyisalittlekid, et al. When he started to leave the courthouse, he was detained and
taken to the ECty Jail. He was told only that he was being held for extradition to MT for
violation ofa protective order. He was never arrested or read his rights. [R VOL:l, P 14, 15.]
11. Windsor was detained pursuant to the UCEA (Article 51 of the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure.) [R VOL: l, P 86.] Windsor was unlawfully detained, incarcerated, denied bond, and
denied discharge. [R VOL: 1, P 16, 55.J Windsor was detained from October 28, 2014 until
December 19, 2014. [R VOL:l, P 86.] (See Case #14-158 in the 443rd District Court in ECty
TX ("Case 14-158"); See Appeal# 10-14-000401-CR in the Tenth Court of Appeals in Waco
TX ("Texas- IO").)
12. On December 19, 2014, Windsor appeared before Judge Cindy Ermatinger and
presented his PWHC. He was released on a Personal Recognizance Bond. The terms were that
Windsor was to appear for a hearing on January 21, 2015 in ECty TX or surrender in Missoula,
MT. [R VOL:l, P 000016, 000086.] The TX Bond was never properly executed and is void. [R
VOL:1, P 000073.] The Transcript of the hearing clearly states that Windsor had two and only
two requirements: (1) that he appear for a January 21, 2015 hearing in ECty TX or (2) tum
himself in in MT. The penalty for failure to do either was forfeiture of $100,000. [R VOL:1, P
000074.] (See Case #14-158; See Appeal# 10-14-000401-CR in the Tenth Court of Appeals in
Waco Texas ("Appeal 10-14-000401-CR"). [Tr VOL:2, P 19 L 2-25; P 20 L 1-25; P 21 L 1-18.]
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13. A requisition from MT was sent to the Governor of TX on December 19, 2014. An
"Appointment of Agent" issued by MT authorized arrest of Windsor in TX. A TX Governor's
Warrant ("GW") was issued on December 23, 2014. The TX GW is valid only for an arrest in
TX. Windsor was never served with the TX GW or arrested. [R VOL: 1, P 86, 87, 94, 94.]
14. Windsor left Dallas, TX on December 29, 2014 en route to surrender in Missoula
County MT on a bench warrant charging him with violation of a non-existent protective order.
His alleged violations were that he sent a Tweet that contained the name "Sean Boushie," that he
published two legal documents that contained the name, and that he sent an email to the attorney
for the UM. All are Constitutionally-protected rights that are not crimes and are specifically
excluded as acts that comprise a violation of a protective order. [R VOL:l, P 000017.]
15. Windsor left TX for MT on December 29, 2015. Deputy Missoula County Attorney
Jennifer Clark set a date and time for the surrender, and the court canceled it. [R VOL:1, P 74.]
16. On December 30, 2014, Wilson and Judge Ermatinger held a hearing without notice to
Windsor. Windsor's P.R. Bond was quashed. He was in Oklahoma en route to surrender in
Missoula County MT, as was the requirement of his Bond. [R VOL:l, P 000017, 18.]
17. In transit, Windsor filed his Appellant's Brief on his PWHC with the Texas-IO. This
should cause all of the actions declared illegal that caused Windsor to be restrained of his liberty.
[R VOL:l, P 18.] (See Case #14-158; See Appeal# 10-14-000401-CR.) Windsor also filed a
Motion to Quash his Bench Warrant. [R VOL:l, P 19.J (See Case #DC-14-509 in the Fourth Jud.
Dist. Court in Montana ("4JDCMT") ("Case DC-14-509").)
18. Windsor has never committed a crime in his life. [R VOL: 1, P 000019.]
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19. Unknown to Windsor, DA Wilson prepared a Wanted Poster for Windsor and
distributed it nationally. On February 19, 2015, Officer Geoff Rowe of the Meridian Police
Department ("MPD") apprehended Windsor. [R VOL:1, P 000019, 20.][Tr VOL:2, P 21 L 4-10.]
20. Windsor was taken to the Ada County ID Jail ("ACIJ"). In preparation for posting
bond in MT, he had over $10,000 cash, gift cards, credit cards, checks, and all of his legal files
and evidence. Officer McKenna counted and recounted. Officer Rowe reappeared and told
McKenna that "Texas" wanted all of Windsor's personal property confiscated as "evidence."
Nothing could be evidence of"bondjumping." This was done to deprive Windsor of the
financial ability to post bond. [R VOL:l, P 21, 22.] There was no search warrant.
21. Windsor was never read his rights or given any documents to show what he was
charged with. Rowe told Windsor that his bond was $2.1 million. $1.1 million from MT and $1
million from Texas. That's $2,100,000 in bond for a 66-year-old who had never been arrested or
charged with a crime now charged with the heinous crime of Tweeting. [R VOL:1, P 22, 23.]
22. On February 19, 2015, Windsor filed Inmate Request Form #1 and began efforts to get
to the Law Library. [R VOL: 1, P 000023.]
23. On February 20, 2015, Windsor had his arraignment with Judge Theresa Gardunia
("JTG"). He did not receive any signed paperwork, and JTG failed to comply with extradition
statutes. The cases are State of Idaho v. Windsor #FE-15-02389 and #FE-15-02390. [R VOL:1,
P 000024.] [Tr VOL:2, P 14 L 8-10.] [Tr VOL:1, P 1-8.] [LC. Title 19 Chapter 45.]
24. Windsor was never shown anything but the unsigned, unswom, false statements of Kari
Higbee. [R VOL:1, P 000050, 000073.] [Tr VOL:2, P 21 L 19-25.] [Tr VOL:1, P 4 L 13-23.]
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25. JTG made no inquiries as to whether Windsor was the person charged with having
committed the crimes alleged, or ifhe had fled from justice. [Tr VOL:I, P 1-8.][R VOL:I, P 81.]
26. JTG granted bond, but Windsor was denied access to his funds. The ACIJ claimed it is
not their problem because the MPD is a separate entity. [R VOL:1, P 000024, 000053, 000081.]
27. There was no evidence that Windsor was the identical person charged; that he
committed crimes; that he was in MT or TX on the dates of the alleged crimes or that he fled.
He was in TX on dates alleged by MT and in OK on the date specified by TX. [R VOL:l, P 82.]
28. There were no arrest warrants attached to the ID Fugitive Complaint, because there is
no ID Fugitive Complaint. [R VOL:l, P 000037, 000082.] [Tr VOL:2, P 14 L 8-10.]
29. JTG did not make a finding of probable cause, as was required. [R VOL:1, P 000040,
000044, 000047, 000082.] [Tr VOL:2, P 9 L 10-25, P 10 L 1-13.J [Tr VOL:l, P 1-8.J
30. Windsor was denied paper, pen, envelopes, postage, and commissary for seven (7) days
in ACIJ. [R VOL:1, P 000024.]
31. On February 20, 2015, Windsor submitted an Inmate Request Form ("IRF") for his
personal property confiscated by the MPD. The Inmate Handbook says all personal property
goes into the inmate's personal property at the Jail and may be released to whomever is
specified. Windsor was denied this important right. On February 21, 2015, Windsor learned the
vehicle he had been driving had disappeared from where it had been parked. The MPD denied
they had it. A family member called every towing company in town and learned that the MPD
had the car towed on February 19, 2015. Windsor demanded releaser. [R VOL:1, P 26, 27.]
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32. On February 21, 2015, Windsor began using toilet tissue to draft motions, make notes,
etc. On February 22, 2015, Windsor put in an IRF for a visit to the Law Library. He finally got
one of his claustrophobia meds and an acid reflux med, but not the right one. Windsor finally
got one hour at the Law Library. [R VOL: 1, P 000027, 28, 29, 30.]
33. Windsor began using scrap paper to draft his PWHC. [R VOL:l, P 30.] The PWHC
complied with the requirements in LC. 19-4204. The PWHC began with this sworn statement:
"Windsor is being unlawfully restrained of his liberty and requests that this Court inquire into the
illegality of the restraint." [R VOL:l, P 3.]
34. On February 23, 2015, he tried to send an emergency motion to be filed with the court.
Windsor sent his PWHC to the Law Library for postage for mailing. [R VOL: 1, P 000032.]
35. The PWHC was finally file-stamped on March 11, 2015 - 16 days after it was mailed
from a few miles away. A Writ was never issued, and no response was ever filed. [DOCKETCV-HC-2015-3902 - In RE: William M. Windsor, Fourth Judicial District Court, Ada Cty.]
36. On March 20, 2015, a hearing was held in CR-FE-2015-02389, 02390, and CV-HC2015-3902 without notice to Windsor. (Tr VOL:2.) At the hearing, Ada County Prosecuting
Attorney Fafa Aldijani falsely told Judge Daniel Steckel ("JDS") that a OW was served on
Windsor. She also claimed he was under arrest, by order of the governor of the State ofID. No
evidence was provided, and Windsor was never served or told this. (Tr VOL:2, P 4 L 10-15.)
Windsor told JDS this. [Tr VOL:2, P 24 L 8-13; P 8 L 18-23; P 22 L 19-25.]
37. Windsor attempted to file an appeal on March 20, 2015, but JDS denied that right. (Tr
VOL:2, P 29 L 6-25, P 30 L 1.) Windsor advised JDS that he would be filing a PWHC on the
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alleged ID GW, but JDS said it was too late. He said: "Well, they're coming. They're coming,
and you're going." (Tr VOL:2, P 30 L 2-3.)
38. Windsor was not given any legal documents at any time despite repeated requests. [R
VOL:l, P 000076.]
39. The State did not present ANY evidence at the March 20, 2015 Hearing on the PWHC~
and the State did not file any evidence or affidavits at any time. (Tr VOL:2.) The entire
"argument" ofFafa Aldijani, the deputy prosecuting attorney, at the habeas corpus hearing was:
"Your honor, this is the defendant's action and petition. And under 19-4510, he can test
the legality of his arrest. So, I'm not hearing that he's challenging that he was illegally
arrested, originally by Meridian Police department, nor that there is some kind of legal
defect in the governor's warrant that has now- has been issued and has been served on
him, and he has been arrested under that. ... So unless the Court finds that issue has been
preserved, I don't know what to say, because the remainder of his complaints are not
something I will be answering because they're not relevant to the issue of habeas corpus .
... Unless you want me to respond to them, but I don't think they're relevant." (Tr
VOL:2, P 23 L 11-25; P 24 L 1-2.)
40. On March 23, 2015, Windsor sent a 30-page sworn Second PWHC to this Court for
filing, Case Number 43010-2015. The PWHC was accompanied by a 41-page sworn Affidavit
and 84 exhibits. This was sent to this Court rather than the Fourth Judicial District Court since
JDS had denied the PWHC even before it was filed. [Tr VOL:2, P 29122-25, P 30 11-3.]
Windsor also sent an "Emergency Motion for Bond" for filing in case #43010-2015.
41. Payment of the filing fee was hand-delivered to the Clerk on March 24, 2015 by friends
of Windsor. A Notice erroneously says it was filed on March 25, 2015.
42. On March 24, 2015, the "Notice of Appeal" was filed in #43009-2015. [DOCKET.]
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43. On March 25, 2015, a "Motion to Supplement Record" was filed in case #43009-2015.
This Motion explained in paragraphs 3 and 4 on pages 1 and 2: "Windsor was denied hearings on
motions filed in the Fourth Judicial District Court Case #'s FE-15-02389, FE-15-02390, and CVHC-2015-03902. As a result, he was unable to get his evidence made part of the record.
Windsor has filed all of the evidence that was in his possession in the Affidavit of Windsor dated
March 23, 2015 filed with this Court as part of Windsor's "Second PWHC." Windsor asks that
the affidavit and exhibits be allowed to supplement the record in this appeal.
44. On March 24, 2015, Windsor sent a "Motion for Discovery" to be filed in Case
#43010-2015; Windsor's "Emergency Motion for Stay" in Case #43009-2015; Windsor's
"Emergency Motion for Bond" in Case #43009-2015. [DOCKET]
45. On March 25, 2015, this Court filed Windsor's "Motion for Legal and Constitutional
Rights" in Case #43009-2015. [DOCKET.] On March 25, 2015, Windsor was taken to Montana.
46. On March 30, 2015, this Court filed Windsor's "Motion to Compel Release of Property
and Request for Injunction," "Emergency Motion for Bond," and "Motion to Supplement
Record" in Case #43009-2015. [DOCKET.]
47. On April 17, 2015, this Court entered an Order in case #43009-2015 conditionally
dismissing this Appeal. On April 20, 2015, this Court suspended this Case #43009-2015 to
allow time to obtain a final district court order or judgment. [DOCKET.]
48. On April 24, 2015, this Court entered an Order in case #43010-2015 denying the
Second PWHC and Motion for Discovery. [DOCKET.]

17

49. On April 26, 2015, Windsor sent a "Response to Order Conditionally Dismissing this
Appeal" for filing in case #43009-2015. [DOCKET.]

SO. On April 26, 2015, Windsor sent a "Supplement to Second PWHC to this Court for
filing in case #43010-2015. This advised that Windsor was unlawfully delivered to Missoula
County MT Sheriff's Deputies on March 25, 2015.
51. On May 18, 2015, this Court sent a letter in case #43009-2015 extending the time for
Windsor to respond to the Order conditionally dismissing this Appeal. [DOCKET.]
52. On June 12, 2015, in #43010-2015 this Court denied Windsor's "Request for Findings
of Fact Conclusions of Law" and "Motion for Reconsideration." [DOCKET.]
ARGUMENT
53. ISSUE #1: Was Windsor unlawfully restrained of his liberty?
54. Yes.
55. LC. Title 19 Criminal Procedure, Chapter 45 Proceedings Against Fugitives from
Justice ("LC. 19-45") is the relevant statute (UCEA). All nine applicable sections were violated.
56. He was restrained in his liberty from February 20 to March 25. [R VOL:1, P 3.]
57. ISSUE #2: Did the State ofldaho violate Windsor's Constitutional rights with
numerous violations of the Idaho statutes on extraditions?
58. Yes. LC. 19-4502, 19-4503, 19-4508, 19-4510, 19-4511, 19-4513, 19-4514, 19-4515,
and 19-4516 were violated. Each violation is explained below.
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59. I.C.19-4502 was violated:
LC. 19-4502. FUGITIVES FROM JUSTICE -- DUTY OF GOVERNOR. ... it is the duty of
the governor of this state to have arrested and delivered up to the executive authority of any
other state of the United States any person charged in that state with treason, felony or other
crime, who has fled from iustice and is found in this state. [emphasis added.]
60. 18 U.S.C. 3182 defines a fugitive from justice as one who commits a crime and flees
from the state where the crime was committed. (In re Martz, 83 Idaho 72,357 P.2d 940 (1960).)
61. Windsor did not flee from justice. [R VOL:1, P 38 - 41, 82.] Windsor has receipts to
show he was not in MT or TX on the dates of alleged crimes. [R VOL: 1, P 76.]
62. Ada County Prosecutors ("ACP") claimed Windsor was a fugitive who "absented
himself/herself from the State of MT having been charges with the felony crimes ...." [CR-FE2015-0002389 and 2390, P 1 ~3.] [Tr VOL: I, P 24.] Two unsigned affidavits and no evidence.
Windsor's statements that he did not flee from justice are uncontroverted. [R VOL:1, P 38 -41.]
"Extradition is a constitutionally mandated procedure, U.S.Const., Art. IV, Sec. 2 .... While
the courts of the asylum state are obligated to prevent the state from becoming a haven for
fugitives from other states, the authority of the state to protect its citizens from illegal arrest
or wrongful rendition must never be forgotten. Ex parte Crawford, 342 P.2d 580 (Okl.
Cr.1959).
"Interstate extradition is conditioned upon two prerequisites: the person demanded must be
'substantially charged with a crime' and he must be a 'fugitive.' Hyatt v. People of New
York ex rel. Corkran, 188 U.S. 691, 23 S.Ct. 456, 47 L.Ed. 657 (1903) ....
"The absence of fugitive status is a valid defense to extradition. Our Supreme Court has held
that where a habeas corpus petitioner shows by clear and convincing evidence that he was
not present in the demanding state at the time of the commission of the crime for which he
stands accused, his petition should be granted." (Walton v. State, 98 Idaho 442, 445, 566
P.2d 765, 768 (1977).)
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" ... no rule of law requires one particular sort of evidence over another .... If the district
court ruled that he had failed to meet his burden solely because of an absence of physical
evidence, that was error." (Walton v. State, 98 Idaho 442,445,566 P.2d 765, 768 (1977).)
63. See I.C. 19-4515; Struve v. Wilcox, 1978, 99 Idaho 205,579 P.2d 1188, cert denied 99
S.Ct. 1037, 439 U.S. 1123, 59 L.Ed 2d. 84.)
"When the Idaho legislature in 1927 adopted the Uniform Extradition Act it recognized that
it would be unfair to detain a person for any extended period without there being a judicial
finding of probable cause for doing so. Accordingly, the Idaho version of the Extradition
Act provides that a person arrested as a fugitive is entitled to have his answer to the fugitive
complaint heard at a judicial examination as to the existence of probable cause: 19-4515.
"A prerequisition warrant committing petitioner to jail could not issue without a judicial
finding that petitioner was the identical person charged with felony check offenses in South
Dakota, and that petitioner probably committed the crime, and that petitioner fled from
South Dakota Justice. Except that there may be in this world more than one Harry T. Struve,
the magistrate did establish that petitioner was indeed a Harry T. Struve. Nothing in the
brief arraignment accorded petitioner rose to the dignity of a hearing, or established the
requisite probable cause which is absolutely essential to a valid order committing petitioner
to jail. ... All three of the South Dakota complaints are devoid of any statement of
underlying facts .... This Idaho complaint with its attached copies of the South Dakota
complaints is inadequate to justify any finding of probable cause .... The magistrate must
satisfy himself of probable cause from 'facts stated by the prosecutor and his witnesses,
tending to establish the commission of the offense and the guilt of the defendant.' LC.§§
19-505 and 506.
"In Gerstein (420 U.S. at 111, 95 S.Ct. at 868), the United States Supreme Court stated that
' ... the Fourth Amendment requires a judicial determination of probable cause as a
prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty following arrest.' And, Whatever procedure a
State may adopt, it must provide a fair and reliable determination of probable cause as a
condition for any significant pretrial restraint of liberty, and this determination must be
made by a judicial officer either before or promptly after arrest.
"Long before Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975) ... this
Court, in the same year that the Idaho legislature improved the Uniform Extradition Act by
adding to Section 15 the safeguard of a probable cause hearing, handed down the landmark
decision of State v. Arregui, 44 Idaho 43, 254 P 788, 52 A.L.R. 463 (1927). In Arregui a
conviction based upon evidence seized under the purported authority of a search warrant
was reversed for the lack of probable cause justifying the issuance of a warrant. In that case
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it was made clear that conclusory statements will not suffice. To justify a finding of
probable cause the affiant must disclose some personal knowledge of the underlying facts
and set them forth, and 'Conclusions must be drawn by the magistrate and not by the
affiant.' Id. at 63, 254 Pat 794.
"This Court 45 years later, in promulgating Rules of Criminal Practice and Procedure,
incorporated the spirit and intent ofl.C. § 19-505 and§ 19-506 (note 11 supra) into Rule 4,
which requires a finding of probable cause before a requested arrest warrant may issue.
What will justify a finding of probable cause is succinctly but clearly set forth: Rule 4.
Warrant or summons upon complaint. (a) ... The finding of probable cause shall be based
upon substantial evidence, which may be hearsay in whole or in part, provided there is a
substantial basis for believing the source of the hearsay to be credible and for believing that
there is a factual basis for the information furnished ....
"On a warrantless arrest, according to Rule 5(d), the magistrate is directed to discharge a
defendant where the probable cause determination made after the arrest fails to justify the
arresting officer's determination of probable cause.
"Considering then that a person arrested either with or without a warrant, as a fugitive from
the Justice of another state, may be detained indefinitely under the provisions of our
prerequisition detention statutes, and that such a person is not a candidate for either a
preliminary hearing or for a speedy trial in Idaho, the wisdom of the legislature in affording
such a person the safeguard of a probable cause hearing, I.C. § 19-4515, must be applauded.
The philosophy evident in this statute was also reflected in our recent decision in Walton v.
State, 98 Idaho 442, 566 P.2d 765 (1977). There, in reviewing a habeas corpus proceeding
testing the validity of extradition on a governor's warrant, this Court said: While the courts
of the asylum state are obligated to prevent the state from becoming a haven for fugitives
from other states, the authority of the state to protect its citizens from illegal arrest or
wrongful rendition must never be forgotten. 98 Idaho at 444, 566 P.2d at 767. (Struve v.
Wilcox, 1978, 99 Idaho 205,579 P.2d 1188, cert denied 99 S.Ct. 1037, 439 U.S. 1123, 59
L.Ed 2d. 84.)
64. Windsor did not commit crimes in MT or TX and flee. [R VOL:l, P 75.][Tr VOL:2, P

24.J
65. The Affidavits of Kari Higbee are false and hearsay. Her claim of personal knowledge
of facts is that she was informed by someone in the Ada County Sheri fr s Office that he or she
"communicated with the authorities of Montana" "and Texas." [R VOL:1, P 75.J Windsor has
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receipts to show he was not in MT or TX on dates of alleged crimes. An OK hotel clerk could
testify that he was in OK when he had to be in TX to "commit a crime." [R VOL:l, P 76.]
"Absence of fugitive status is a valid defense to extradition." (Kerr v. Watson, 1982, 103
Idaho 478, 649 P.2d 1234.)
66. Windsor had the right to present evidence to show he is not a fugitive from justice.
(See U.S. Constitution, Article 4, Section 2, Clause 2; Walton v. State, 1977, 98 Idaho 70,
403 P.2d 221, certiorari denied 86 S.Ct. 906,383 U.S. 916, 15 L.Ed. 2d 669; Norton v.
State, 1970, 93 Idaho 648,470 P.2d 413, cert denied 91 S.Ct. 918,401 U.S. 936.)
67. J.C. 19-4503 was violated:
I.C. 19-4503. FORM OF DEMAND. No demand for the extradition of a person charged
with crime in another state shall be recognized by the governor unless in writing, alleging,
except in cases arising under section 19-4506, Idaho Code, that the accused was present in
the demanding state at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, and that
thereafter he fled from the state. Such demand must be accompanied by a copy of an
indictment or by information supported by affidavit of probable cause, judicial fmding
of probable cause, or plea of guilty, as reflected in any document from the court in the
demanding state, or by affidavit made before a judge or magistrate, together with a
copy of any warrant which was issued thereupon, or by a copy of a iudgment of
conviction or sentence imposed in execution thereof, together with a statement by the
executive authority of the demanding state that the person claimed has fled the state
after being charged with a crime .... The indictment, information, or affidavit made before
the judge or magistrate must substantially charge the person demanded with having
committed a crime under the law of that state, and the copy of the indictment, information,
affidavit, or judgment of conviction or sentence must be authenticated by the executive
authority making the demand.
68. Windsor did not flee from justice. [R VOL:l, P 000082.]
69. But the ACP falsely claimed Windsor was a fugitive claiming he "absented
himself/herself from the State of Montana having been charges with the felony crimes .... " [CRFE-2015-0002389 and 0002390, P l if3.] But there was no evidence of this. Windsor's sworn
statements are uncontroverted. [R VOL:!, P 000038 - 41.]
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70. Windsor was not substantially charged with a crime. [R VOL:1, P 000042 - 000043.J
71. J.C. 19-4506 does not apply:
72. I.C. 19-4506 does not apply because the ACP held and charged Windsor on the claim

that he was a fugitive, citing J.C. 19-4513. [CR-FE-2015-0002389 and 0002390, P 1 ,rJ.]
73. I.C.19-4508 was violated:
I.C. 19-4508. MANNER AND PLACE OF EXECUTION -- FACSIMILE AND
ELECTRONIC SERVICE. (1) Such warrant shall authorize the peace officer or other person
to whom directed to arrest the accused at any time and any place where he may be
found within the state and to command the aid of all peace officers or other persons in the
execution of the warrant, and to deliver the accused, subject to the provisions of this chapter,
to the duly authorized agent of the demanding state. (2) A certified copy of the warrant,
signed by the governor, may be sent via facsimile or in electronic format, to be executed
pursuant to subsection (1) of this section. [emphasis added.]
74. Windsor was never served with a OW, so nothing was ever executed. [R VOL:1, P
000087.] [Tr VOL:2, P 24 L 8-13; P 8 L 18-23; P 22 L 19-25.]
75. Service means the delivery of a writ, summons, complaint, criminal summons, or other
notice or order by an authorized server upon another. Proper service thereby provides official
notification that a legal action or proceeding against an individual has been commenced
"Service of process refers to a formal delivery of documents that is legally sufficient to
charge the defendant with notice of a pending action." (Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft
v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 700 (1988).)
76. Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure ("IRCP") establish that service and execution mean
formal delivery of documents. Execute is defined as ''to finish, accomplish, make complete,
fulfill; perform." (See IRCP Rule 4(a), 4(c)(l), 4(c)(3), 4(d)(l), 4(d)(2), 4(d)(6), 4(e)(2), 4(g),
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S(b), 5(f). Service of process in cases filed in the U.S. district courts is governed by Rule 4 of

the FRCP. Service and execution require formal delivery of documents.

77. Windsor was not given or served any legal documents at any time. He was never
served with an ID, MT, or TX warrant). [R VOL: 1, P 000075, 76.]
78. J.C. 19-4510 was violated:
LC. 19-4510. RIGHTS OF ACCUSED PERSON --APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS. No person arrested upon such warrant shall be delivered over to
the appointed agent for the executive authority demanding him unless he shall first be
taken forthwith before a judge or magistrate of a court of record in this state, who
shall inform him of the demand made for his surrender and of the crime with which he
is charged, and that he has the right to demand and procure legal counsel; if the
prisoner or his counsel shall state that he or they desire to test the legality of his arrest,
the judge or magistrate of such court of record shall fix a reasonable time to be allowed
him within which to apply for a writ of habeas corpus. When such writ is applied for,
notice thereof, and of the time and place of hearing thereon, shall be given to the prosecuting
officer of the county in which the arrest is made and in which the accused is in custody, and
to the said agent of the demanding state. [emphasis added.]
79. On February 20, 2015, Windsor had his arraignment with JTG in State of Idaho v.
Windsor #FE-15-02389 and #FE-15-02390. The things that a judge is supposed to do in

extradition were not done. [R VOL:l, P 24.] [Tr VOL:l, P 1-8.J A complaint was not made
against him under oath setting forth the grounds for the arrest as required in 19-4513 and 194514. [R VOL:1, P 37, 77.J [Tr VOL:2, P14 L 8-10.J
80. Windsor was shown nothing but the unsigned, unswom, improper false statements of
ACP Kari Higbee. The affidavits fail to cite the laws allegedly violated in the demanding states
and fail to reasonably inform Windsor of the conduct asserted to represent the violation. (I.C. 194503.) [R VOL:l, P 50, 73.] [Tr VOL:2, P21 L 19-25.J (Tr VOL:l, P4 L 13-23.] JTG made no
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inquiries as to whether the accused is the person charged with having committed the crimes
alleged, or that he has fled from justice. (Struve v. Wilcox, 1978, 99 Idaho 205,579 P.2d 1188,
cert denied 99 S.Ct. 1037, 439 U.S. 1123.) [R VOL:1, P 000081.] [Tr VOL:1, Pl-8.)
81. JTG failed to fix a reasonable time for Windsor to be allowed within which to apply for
a writ of habeas corpus. (LC. 19-4510.) [R VOL:l, P 000046 - 000049.]
82. JTG granted bond [R VOL:1, P 000024], but Windsor was denied access to his cash,
gift cards, credit cards, and checks. The ACIJ claimed it was not their problem because the MPD
is a separate entity. Charges were from Ada County, but the MPD had confiscated Windsor's
ability to pay the cash bond. [R VOL:l, P 53, 81.] There was no evidence whatsoever presented
by the State. [R VOL:l, P 82.] There were no arrest warrants attached to the ID Fugitive
Complaint, and there is no ID Fugitive Complaint. [R VOL: 1, P 37, 82.] [Tr VOL:2, P 14 L 810.] JTG did not make a finding of probable cause, as was required. [R VOL:1, P 40, 44, 47,
82.] [TrVOL:2, P 9 L 10-25, P 10 L 1-13, P 1-8.]
83. At the March 20, 2015 Hearing, JDS erroneously claimed that HE found probable cause
on February 20, 2015. He wasn't there; it was JTG, and ACP Kari Higbee was not even there.
(Tr VOL:2, P 27, L 4-9.) [Tr VOL:2, P 9 L 10-25, P 10 L 1-13.] [R VOL:l, P000040.]
"The constitutional requirement that no warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation and particularly describing the person or things to be
seized, applies to arrest as well as search warrants. Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S.
480, 78 S. Ct. 1245, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1503 (1958). Butler v. State, 296 So. 2d 673 (Miss. 1974).

" ... Aguilar v. Texas (1963), 378 U.S. 108, 84 S. Ct. 1509, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723; Giordenello v.
U.S. (1958), 357 U.S. 480, 78 S. Ct. 1245, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1502. Since the record before our
habeas Judge clearly established that no determination of probable cause was made by any
Judge or any other official who might qualify as a neutral and detached magistrate, prior to
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the issuance of the extradition warrant by the Governor of this State, or at any other time for
that matter, appellant was entitled to a judgment of discharge from custody." (John Lee
Bailey v. William M. Cox, 296 N.E.2d 422; 260 Ind. 448 (05/24/73).)
84. The ACP claims an ID GW was issued, but Windsor was never served with it or
arrested on it. [Tr VOL:2, P24 L 8-13; P8 L 18-23; P22 L 19-25.] Windsor was delivered to the
appointed agent for the executive authority of MT in violation of I.C.19-4510. He was never
taken forthwith before a judge or magistrate of a court, was never informed of the demand made
for his surrender and of the crime with which he was charged, was never advised that he had the
right to demand and procure legal counsel. When told at the hearing on March 20, 2015 that
there was an ID OW, he stated that he desired to test the legality of his arrest, but JDS did not fix
a reasonable time to be allowed him within which to apply for a writ of habeas corpus. All JDS
said was "They are coming, and you are going." (Tr VOL:2, P 21, L 19-25.) (Tr VOL:2, P 29 L
21-25; P30 L 1-6.)
85. The state and federal statutes governing extradition similarly recognize an accused
person's right to challenge an improper demand.
"The accused person may petition for habeas corpus on numerous grounds. He may allege
that the extradition papers are not in order; that the charge is inadequate to support
extradition, or is insubstantial; that he is not the person named in the extradition papers; or
that he is not a fugitive because he was not present in the demanding state at the time of the
alleged offense. Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 99 S.Ct. 530, 58 L.Ed.2d 521 (1978).
The petitioner also may be entitled to a finding of probable cause for his arrest in the asylum
state. Id. (Blackmun, J., Concurring)." (State of Idaho v. Wesley Earl Barnhouse, 726 P.2d
785; 111 Idaho 673 (09/23/86).)

86. I.C. 19-4511 requires that the Ada County Sheriff, ACP, or Judge Daniel Steckel
be charged with violation of I.C. 19-4511:
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I.C. 19-4511. PENALTY FOR NONCOMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 19-4510,
IDAHO CODE. Any officer who shall deliver to the agent of the demanding state a
person in his custody for extradition under the governor's warrant, in willful disobedience
to section 19-4510, Idaho Code, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction,
shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or be imprisoned not more
than six (6) months, or both.
87.

Windsor informed the ACIJ and the MT deputies that he had filed for a PWHC

and that this statute was being violated when they took him to MT on March 25, 2015.
88. J.C. 19-4513 has been violated:
LC. 19-4513. ARREST PRIOR TO REQUISITION. (1) Except in cases arising under
section 19-4506, Idaho Code, a judge or magistrate shall issue a warrant directed to any
peace officer commanding him to apprehend the person named therein, wherever he may be
found in this state, and to bring him before the same or any other judge or magistrate
which may be available in or of convenient access to the place where the arrest may be
made, to answer to the charge or complaint and affidavit: (a) Whenever any person
within this state is charged on the oath of any credible person before any iudge or
magistrate of this state with the commission of any crime in any other state and has
fled from justice, or has been convicted of a crime in that state and has escaped from
confinement, or has broken the terms of his bail, probation or parole; or (b) Whenever
complaint is made before any iudge or magistrate in this state setting forth on the
affidavit of any credible person in another state that a crime has been committed in
such other state and that the accused has been charged in such state with the
commission of the crime and has fled from iustice, or has been convicted of a crime in
that state and has escaped from confinement, or has broken the terms of his bail, probation
or parole and is believed to be in this state. (2) A certified copy of the sworn charge or
complaint and affidavit upon which the warrant is issued shall be attached to the
warrant.
89. LC. 19-4506 does not apply since Windsor was classified as a fugitive. As documented
above, none of these requirements were met. [Tr VOL:2, P14 L 8-10.] [R VOL:1, P 37, 50-52.]
(I.C. 19-4513 and 19-4514.) [R VOL:1, P 37, 77.] (State v. Bradley, 679 P.2d 635; 106 Idaho
358 (09/01/83).)
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90. Windsor was not held pursuant to a warrant. However, ACP Kari Higbee claimed he
was being held pursuant to I. C. 19-4513, which clearly requires that an ID judge or magistrate
was to have issued a warrant. There was no warrant. [R VOL:1, P 50.]
91.

The law was violated, and Windsor was "arrested" and incarcerated unlawfully.

92. The Florida case of France v. Judd, 932 So.2d 1263, 31 Fla. L. Weekly D 1913
(Fla.App. Dist.2 07/14/2006) is similar to the instant matter in that many requirements of the
extradition statutes were violated, and the court ordered that France's arrest and detention were
unauthorized due to noncompliance with the UCEA. "For that reason, we granted France's
PWHC and ordered her released on the out-of-state charges."
93. I.C. 19-4514 was violated:
LC. 19-4514. ARREST WITHOUT A WARRANT. The arrest of a person may be
lawfully made by any peace officer or a private person, without a warrant upon reasonable
information that the accused stands charged in the courts of a state with a crime punishable
by death or imprisonment for a term exceeding one ( 1) year. When so arrested the accused
must be taken before a judge or magistrate with all practicable speed, and complaint
must be made against him under oath setting forth the grounds for the arrest as
provided in section 19-4513, Idaho Code, and thereafter his answer shall be heard as if
he had been arrested on a warrant. [emphasis added.]
94. Windsor was clearly incarcerated in the ACIJ without a warrant. So, I.C. 4513 was
obligatory, but none of those requirements were met. Windsor's "arrest" and incarceration was
unlawful. At the time of the arrest, Officer Rowe didn't even know why Windsor was wanted
and had no independent information constituting probable cause. [R VOL: 1, P 21-23.] (David

Allen Roeder v. State of Texas, 768 S.W.2d 745 (12/29/88).)
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95. LC. 19-4514 details the requirements for arresting an allegedly-accused person when
there is no warrant issued. The other requirements are the same as LC. 19-4513. The first and
most important requirement is that there has to be an oath that the allegedly-accused committed a
crime in another state and fled from justice. The accused must then be speedily brought before
an ID judge or magistrate to answer the charge or complaint and affidavit. The accused must be
allowed to answer.
96. In this case, Windsor was not arrested. He was taken before JTG on February 20,
2014, but there was no complaint or oath that he committed a crime in another state and fled
from justice. He was not given the opportunity to answer the charge or complaint and affidavit.
There was no complaint or affidavit-ever! [R VOL:l, P 000037.] [Tr VOL:2, P14 L 8-10.] [Tr
VOL:l, Pl-8.) This clearly violated LC. 19-4514 and the UCEA.
" ... no excuse for failing to provide a prisoner, incarcerated in Pennsylvania, with the
basic protection required by the Act. Appellant was held well beyond the period
permitted in clear violation of his rights under the Act. Cf. Commonwealth ex rel.
Heaton v. Harvey, 193 Pa. Superior Ct. 315, 164 A.2d 123 (1960) (dissenting opinion by
Montgomery, J. ).... The order holding appellant for extradition is reversed and appellant
is discharged." (Commonwealth v. McCaine, 275 A.2d 867,218 Pa. Super. 274
(03/23/71).) (See also State v. Carter, 785 N.W.2d 516,327 Wis.2d 1, 2010 WI 77 (Wis.
07/14/2010); Ex Parle Jerome Wall, No. 02-11-00326-CR, (Tex.App. Dist.2
11/21/2012); State v. Hughes, 229 N.W.2d 655, 68 Wis. 2d 662 (06/30/75); Application
of Caudill, 352 P.2d 926, 1960 OK CR 17 (Okla.Crim.App. 02/17/1960); Laverne
Stanley Brightman v. Carl W. Withrow, 304 S.E.2d 688, 172 W.Va. 235 (06/29/83);
State v. Haynes, 8 Ohio App.3d 119,1982; Commonwealth v. Fennell, 252 A.2d 678,
434 Pa. 232 (04/23/69); Oregon v. Epps, 36 Or.ApP 519, 585 P.2d 425 (Or.App.
10/16/1978); State v. Schenk, No. C5-00-1360 (Minn.App. 03/20/2001).)
97. JTG did not find probable cause on February 20, 2015 as was required. [R VOL:1, P
000040, 000044, 000047, 000082.] No facts had been presented to ACP under oath to show
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probable cause. [Tr VOL:2, P9 L 10-25, PIO L 1-13.] [Tr VOL:l, Pl-8.] As no such
determination was made, Windsor was restrained unlawfully. (Struve v. Wilcox, 99 Idaho 205,
579 P.2d 1188 (1978); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975).)
(See also Kirkland v. Preston, 128 U.S.App.D.C. 148, 385 F.2d 670 (1967); Lerardi v.
Gunter, 528 F.2d 929, 930-31 (1st Cir. 1976); United States ex rel. Grano v. Anderson, 446
F.2d 272 (3d Cir. 1971); Wellington v. South Dakota, 413 F.SupP 151 (D.S.D.1976);
United States ex rel Mayberry v. Yeager, 321 F.Supp. 199 (D.N.J.1971); Pippin v. Leach,
188 Colo. 385,534 P.2d 1193 (1975); People v. Doran, 401 Mich. 235,258 N.W.2d 406
(1977); Sheriffv. Thompson, 85 Nev. 211,452 P.2d 911 (1969); Smith v. Helgemoe, 369
A.2d 218 (N .H.1977).)
98. As neither LC. 19-4513 nor LC. 19-4514 were complied with, there was no legal basis
to "arrest" or incarcerate Windsor. Everything about the detention, incarceration, denial of bond,
and refusal to discharge Windsor was against the law. [R VOL:1, P 000050 - 000054.]
99. ID law establishes that Windsor was illegally detained and was illegally incarcerated
from February 20, 2015 to March 25, 2015, and was then unlawfully delivered to Missoula
County MT Sheriff's Deputies on March 25, 2015. [R VOL:1, P 50 - 52.] (See ,,45, 87, 90.)
100. I.C. 19-4515 was violated:
LC. 19-4515. COMMITMENT TO A WAIT REQUISITION -- BAIL. If from the
examination before the judge or magistrate it appears that the person held is the person
charged with having committed the crime alleged and, except in cases arising under section
19-4506, Idaho Code, that he has fled from justice, the judge or magistrate must, by a
warrant reciting the accusation, commit him to the county jail for such a time not exceeding
thirty (30) days and specified in the warrant, as will enable the arrest of the accused to be
made under a warrant of the governor on a requisition of the executive authority of the state
having jurisdiction of the offense, unless the accused gives bail as provided in section 194516, Idaho Code, or until he shall be legally discharged.
101.

There was no examination before a judge or magistrate. Windsor did not flee

from justice. There was no warrant committing him to the ACIJ for 30 days or any period of
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time. But ID law clearly requires such an examination and a warrant. (Harry T. Struve v. Robert

Wilcox, 579 P.2d 1188; 99 Idaho 205 (02/03/78).) LC. 19-4506 does not apply.
(See France v. Judd, 932 So.2d 1263, 31 Fla. L. Weekly D1913 (Fla.App. Dist.2
07/14/2006); Bearden v. State, 155 S.E.2d 5,223 Ga. 381 (Ga. 05/18/1967); James v. State,
584 P.2d 213, 1978 OK 115 (Okla. 09/12/1978); Carter v. State, 708 P.2d 1097, 1985 OK
83 (Okla. 10/15/1985); State v. Carter, 785 N.W.2d 516,327 Wis.2d 1, 2010 WI 77 (Wis.
07/14/2010); Commonwealth Pennsylvania v. William Green, 581 A.2d 544,525 Pa. 424
(09/19/90); State v. District Court, 86 Nev. 531,471 P.2d 224 (Nev. 7/1/1970); State v.
Holliman, 247 Mont. 365, 805 P.2d 52 (Mont. 01/22/1991); Nessman v. Sumpter, 27 Wash.
App. 18,615 P.2d 522 (Wa.App. 07/31/1980).)
102. I.C. 19-4516 was violated:
LC. 19-4516. BAIL -- IN WHAT CASES -- CONDITIONS OF BOND. Unless the offense
with which the prisoner is charged is shown to be an offense punishable by death or life
imprisonment under the laws of the state in which it was committed, a iudge or magistrate
in this state may admit the person arrested to bail by bond with sufficient sureties, and
in such sum as he deems proper, conditioned for his appearance before him at a time
specified in such bond, and for his surrender, to be arrested upon the warrant of the governor
of this state. [emphasis added.]
103. I.C. 19-4516 provides that a judge or magistrate in ID "may admit the person arrested
to bail by bond .... " (See ID Constitution, Article 1, Section 6; LC. Sections 13-201, 19-4218,
19-4505, 19-4515, 19-4516; U.S. Constitution Amendment 8; [R VOL: 1, P 88 - 89.] (Drake v.
Spriggs, No. 13-03-429-CV (Tex.App. Dist.13 12/14/2006).) JTG set two $50,000 bonds. [R

VOL: 1, P 52.] [Tr VOL: 1, P5 L 15-16.] Windsor went to booking at the ACIJ to pay a cash
bond. The ACIJ refused to release him claiming there was a TX hold. [R VOL: 1, P 53 - 54.]
But the TX GW dated December 23, 2014 is invalid in ID, and the claim that it was a "no bond
warrant" was totally bogus. [R VOL:l, P 54.] The only state with jurisdiction to set bond in
these matters was ID. (Case# FE-15-02389 and 02390 [R VOL:1, P 89.] [Tr VOL:2, Pl 1 L 1-9.]
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104. There were no other grounds to hold Windsor in the ACIJ. [R VOL:l, P 88.]
l 05. The ACIJ was "confused" over this issue. Grievance responses that Windsor received
indicated "you are being held on a Governor's Warrant out of Ellis, TX. The Governor's
Warrant is a no bond warrant." But it is clearly not a "no bond warrant." It is silent as to bond,
and it is a warrant valid for an extradition to MT arrest solely "wherever found in this state
(TX)." [R VOL:1, P 88, 54, 95, 96.] It is a warrant pursuant to the UCEA. It is invalid as to the
detention of Windsor in ID, only valid in TX. [R VOL:l, P 87.]
106. There is no such thing as a hold on an extradition matter. The sole legal authority
applicable to extradition is the UCEA, LC. Title 19 Section 45. [R VOL: 1, P 87-89.]
107. Windsor should have been released on bond. [R VOL:l, P 000053, 000089.] His rights
were absolutely violated. [Tr VOL:2, PIO L 14-25; Pl I L 1-9.]
l 08. I.C. 19-4517 did not apply in this case. There was never a request for extension.
109. I.C. 19-4526 is applicable only in that case law from any state should apply in this

matter.
110. I.C. 19-4530 Written Waiver of Extradition Proceedings does not apply as

Windsor made it clear that he was fighting extradition.

111. When Windsor was "arraigned on February 20, 2015, he advised JTG that he was
fighting extradition. [Tr VOL:l, P4 L 13-15.]

112. ISSUE #3: Were Windsor's Constitutional rights violated?
I 13. Yes. Windsor's personal property was unlawfully seized and searched, and he was
denied important property needed for legal matters and was denied bond money.
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114. Windsor was unlawfully denied bond.
115. Windsor has been repeatedly denied access to courts.
116. Windsor has been subjected to medical mistreatment, denied the liberty of taking his
needed medications.
117. Windsor has been denied discovery.
118. Windsor has been denied requested hearings, and none of his motions were ever set for
hearings or acted upon.
119. Windsor was repeatedly denied release.
120. ISSUE #4: Was Windsor's property unlawfully seized and searched?
121. Yes. See paragraphs 20, 31 above. Windsor has been restrained of his liberty by
having his personal property unlawfully seized and his access denied. [R VOL:1, P 000058.]
122. This violated LC. and the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. (See LC. §§ 194403, 4404, 4405 and 4406; Harry T. Struve v. Robert Wilcox, 579 P.2d 1188; 99 Idaho 205
(02/03/78).)
123. ISSUE #5: Did the State fail to make a complaint against Windsor?
124. Yes. See paragraphs 79, 82, 88, 89, 95, 97, and 98 above.
125. ISSUE #6: Was Windsor wrongfully considered a fugitive?
126. Yes. See paragraphs 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, and 69 above.
127. ISSUE #7: Was Windsor not charged with a crime within the jurisdiction of the
demanding state?
128. Yes. See paragraphs 79, 82, 88, 89, 95, 97, and 98 above.
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129. ISSUE #8: Was there a failure to substantially charge Windsor with a crime?

130. Yes. See paragraphs 79, 82, 88, 89, 95, 97, and 98 above.
131. ISSUE #9: Did Ada County courts fail to make timely determinations regarding
Windsor?

132. Yes. See paragraphs 67, 78-84, 88, 94, 95, 101, 103, and 196.
133. ISSUE #10: Should Windsor have been released by Judge Theresa Gardunia on
February 20, 2015 when there was no finding of probable cause?

134. Yes. See paragraphs 29, 82, 83, 99, 145, and 158.
135. ISSUE #11: Was Windsor unlawfully held in the Ada County Idaho Jail?

136. Yes. See paragraphs 20, 21, 23-29, 36, 59-70, 78-95, 101, and 104-111 above.
137. ISSUE #12: Did the State fail to meet the requirements of I.C. 19-4515, and was
Windsor wrongfully denied bail?

138. Yes. See paragraphs 103-106, 108, 111, 112, 119, and 155 above.
139. There was no such finding of probable cause. [R VOL:l, P 000040, 000044, 000047,
000082.] [Tr VOL:2, P9 L 10-25, PIO L 1-13.] [Tr VOL:1, Pl-8.]
140. ISSUE #13: Was Windsor denied due process?

141. Yes. There were repeated violations of Windsor's rights. He was denied due process,
denied use of a law library, denied filing of his PWHC, denied action by a judge on the PWHC,
and denied his money and personal property. See ~120-34, 37-39, 54-58, 117, 127, and 128.
142. Windsor was denied the ability to effectively handle his pending civil litigation.
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"The fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to
assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners
with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law." (Bounds
v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1978).) See also Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319,321 (1972); Exparte
Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941); White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760 (1945). Prisoners must have
reasonable access to a law library or to persons trained in the law. Younger v. Gilmore, 404
U.S. 15 (1971).
143. Ada County ID violated the cruel and unusual punishments clause of the Eighth
Amendment of the United States Constitution by denying Windsor access to the courts, denying
access to a law library, incarcerating him with no legal right to do so, and violating other rights.
[TrVOL:2, P17 L 1-25; P18 L 1-25; P19 L l.]
144. JTG failed to make required inquiries. (Struve v. Wilcox, 1978, 99 Idaho 205, 579 P.2d
1188, cert denied 99 S.Ct. 1037, 439 U.S. 1123, 59 L.Ed 2d. 84.) [R VOL:1, P 000081.]
145. JTG granted bond, but Windsor was denied access to his funds to pay the cash bond. [R
VOL:1, P 000081.]
146. There was no evidence that Windsor committed crimes. There was no evidence that the
accused was in MT or TX on the dates of the alleged crimes and that he fled. Windsor was in
TX on all dates alleged by MT and in OK on the date specified by TX. (J.C. 19-4515; Id at 205.)
[R VOL:1, P 000082.]
147. There were no arrest warrants attached to the ID Fugitive Complaint, and there is no ID
Fugitive Complaint. [R VOL: 1, P 000082.]
148. JTG did not make a finding of probable cause, as was required. [R VOL:l, P 000082.]

149. ISSUE #14: Is the lack of access to a law library in the Ada County Jail a
violation of Constitutional rights?

35

150. Yes. Windsor did not have adequate access to a law library. One hour per week is a
bad joke.
151. See paragraphs 22, 32, 33 150, 152, 153, and 162. There is much more evidence of
this. (See PWHC in 43010-2015.)
152. ISSUE #15: Was Windsor denied access to a court to seek redress of grievances?
153. Yes. Windsor was never informed of his habeas corpus right after the alleged issuance
of an ID GW. Windsor was denied access to a law library, denied the right to file his PWHC,
then denied consideration of his PWHC when he presented it to JDS and the ID Supreme Court.
See paragraphs 39-41, 48, 52, 78-85, 98-100, 105-111, 118-120, 122, 123, 125-128, 189, 191,
195, 197-202, 214-220.

154. ISSUE #16: Was the warrant insufficient in this matter?
155. Yes. There was no warrant. The record in this case and the underlying case show that
there was never a warrant of any type.

156. ISSUE #17: Is there no evidence that Windsor committed any crimes?
157. There is no evidence. See paragraphs 12, 14, 18, 61, and 78.
158. It is not a crime in TX) to fail to appear for a hearing on an extradition matter; on an
extradition matter that a defendant does not receive notice of; on an extradition matter when the
PR Bond and the judge set no such requirement; on an extradition matter when the TX court had
no jurisdiction. (See Appellant's Brief in 10-14-00401-CR.) Windsor was illegally detained,
illegally incarcerated, illegally denied bond, illegally denied release in TX. [R VOL: 1, P
000078.] The alleged charge in TX is that Windsor committed an unidentified felony by failing
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to appear on a PR bond. But the terms of the bond in an extradition case are dictated by the
UCEA. (See I.C. 19-4528.) [R VOL:1, P 000073.]
159. See paragraphs 7, 8, 12-16, 18, 64, and 65.
160. The UCEA provides only for forfeiture of the bond and arrest if the person is within the
state. The accused was not in TX. [R VOL:l, P 000073.]
161. The TX Bond was never properly executed and is void. [R VOL:1, P 000073.]
162. The Transcript of the December 19, 2014 TX Hearing clearly states that Windsor had
two and only two requirements - (1) that he appear for a January 21, 2015 hearing in ECty TX or
(2) turn himself in in MT. The sole penalty for failure to do either was forfeiture of $100,000. [R
VOL:l, P 000074.]
163. Windsor left TX for MT on December 29, 2015. Assistant MT Attorney Jennifer Clark
set a date and time for the surrender, and the court modified the date and then canceled the date.
The case is now pending assignment of a new judge, a new hearing date, and action on the
accused's Motion to Quash Bench Warrant in DC-14-509. [R VOL:l, P 000074.]
164. It is not a crime in TX, MT, or ID to do any act allegedly restricted in the state where
an ex parte temporary order of protection ("TOP") was issued and no hearing was ever held to
convert the "TOP" to a permanent order. Windsor cannot be subject to a "TOP" in TX, MT, or
ID in 2014 or 2015 as the "TOP" says it expired in mid-September 2013. [R VOL:l, P 000079.]
165. There is no protective order in MT or TX or ID, and there is no proof of one. [R
VOL:1, P 000079.]
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166. MT protective orders are valid only in MT, as clearly provided by statute. The MT
Bench Warrant clearly states that it applies to arrests only in MT. [R VOL:l, P 000079.]
167. The Governor's Warrant ("OW") from TX is valid only in TX if Windsor is in TX. It
did not surface until after Windsor left the state. [R VOL:1, P 000079.]
168. There is no ID OW. [R VOL:1, P 000080.]
169. It is not a crime in TX, ID, or MT, and it does not violate a protective order to do
something that is a Constitutionally-protected right. Windsor's MT charges are for tweeting the
name "Sean Boushie" once, publishing the name "Sean Boushie" four times in legal documents
published online, emailing an attorney a legal service document, and maintaining a website for a
movie. All of these acts are legal in every state in America. [R VOL:l, P 000080.]
170. ISSUE #18: Was Windsor subiected to cruel and unusual punishment?
171. Yes. See paragraphs 20, 21, 23-29, 36, 59-70, 78-95, 102, 104-119, 143, 185 above.
[TrVOL:2, P17 L 1-25; P18 L 1-25; P19 L 1.] [R VOL:1, P 000059- 000061.]

172. ISSUE #19: Was Windsor unlawfully denied discharge pursuant to Idaho Code
19-4513?
173. Yes. See paragraphs 89-95 above.
174. After either LC. 19-4513 or LC. 19-4514 takes place, the ID judge or magistrate is to
issue a warrant reciting the accusation and committing the allegedly-accused "for such time not

exceedine; thirty days" while the demanding state tries to obtain an ID GW.
175. If the accused is not discharged after 30 days, the law has been violated, and the
allegedly-accused has been imprisoned unlawfully. [Tr VOL:2 P 14 L 11-14.]
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176. The Bench Warrant issued by Missoula County MT Judge Karen Townsend was not
valid anywhere but MT, and it may not have even been valid there. The use of it to detain
Windsor in ID was illegal.
I 77. MT, TX, and ID have identical laws as each adopted the UCEA.
"The authority for Montana officials to arrest a defendant wanted in another state for a crime
is found in Section 46-30-227, MCA. If the defendant does not consent to extradition. he
must be committed to the county iail for not exceeding 30 days or admitted to bail,
Section 46-30-302, MCA, to provide time to obtain a requisition from the demanding state.
Upon receipt of the requisition, the Governor of this state may then issue an arrest warrant
against the defendant. Section 46-30-213, MCA. The 30-day period is a limitation upon
the power of Montana to hold the defendant without a requisition from the demanding
state when Montana proceeds against him under Section 46-30-227, MCA" (State v.
Campbell, 761 P.2d 393,233 Mont. 502 (Mont. 09/12/1988).) [emphasis added.]
178. The statute says "committed to the county jail for not exceeding 30 days or admitted to
bail. ... " "Committed" means put in jail. Windsor was put in jail on February 19, 2015. The 30
days expired on March 21, 2015. [Tr VOL:2, P 14 L 11-14.] An ID OW had not been served on
Windsor, and he had not been arrested under the required ID OW. Windsor should have been
released. [R VOL:l, P 000087.] [Tr VOL:2, P24 L 8-13; P8 L 18-23; P22 L 19-25.]
"We therefore find that in order for petitioner to have been released on a PWHC on the
ground that he was held for 3 days without a proper court order while awaiting the issuance
and service of the requisition warrant, he should have filed the same and demanded
release prior to the service of the rendition warrant of the State of Illinois." (People Ex
Rel. Vasquez v. Pratt, 322 N.E.2d 74, 24 Ill. App.3d 927 (Ill.App. Dist.3 01/13/1975).)
[emphasis added.]
179. The record will show that there was no request for an extension. Due to the fact that no
extension had been sought as of Day 30 and Windsor filed his habeas corpus petitions before any
attempt to seek an extension, Windsor should have been discharged.
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"On day 31 Lovejoy filed a motion stating that his 30 days were expired and no extension
had been sought. There was a hearing on Lovejoy's motion, where the judge denied the
motion and went on to order recommitment for 60 days. The court had no authority to do
that because it had allowed the first 30 days to expire." (Eugene Lovejoy v. State of
Vermont, Supreme Court of Vermont, No. 87-137, 53 I A.2d 921, 148 Vt. 239 (07/10/87).)
180, Windsor requested his discharge orally and in writing to the officers at the ACD.
181. Windsor filed the appropriate petition for habeas seeking discharge before MT
allegedly produced a GW.
182. The State ofID lost jurisdiction over Windsor at the very latest on March 22, 2015 (day
31 ). Any orders issued after that date are invalid for want of jurisdiction.
(See Commonwealth ex rel. Knowles v. Lester, 456 Pa. 423,321 A.2d 637 (1974);
Commonwealth ex rel. Marion Jacobs v. A.S. Dgiacintio, 468 A.2d 1118, 321 Pa. Super.
536 (07/26/83); Utah v. Terry Robert Jensen, 818 P.2d 551, 170 Utah Adv. Rep. 30
(09/30/91); King v. Mitchell, 14 Or.App. 382,513 P.2d 519 (Or.App. 08/27/1973).)
183. Windsor was not released as required. [Tr VOL:2, P 14 L 11-14.]

184. ISSUE #20: Did the State fail to controvert the allegations in the PWHC?
185. Yes. The State addressed none of the issues. The State did not present ANY evidence
at the March 20, 2015 Hearing on the PWHC, and the State never filed any evidence or affidavits
at any time. (Tr VOL:2.) The entire "argument" of Fafa Aldijani, the deputy prosecuting
attorney, at the habeas corpus hearing was:
''Your honor, this is the defendant's action and petition. And under 19-4510, he can test the
legality of his arrest. So, I'm not hearing that he's challenging that he was illegally arrested,
originally by Meridiart Police department, nor that there is some kind oflegal defect in the
governor's warrant that has now - has been issued and has been served on him, and he has
been arrested under that.
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"So unless the Court finds that issue has been preserved, I don't know what to say, because
the remainder of his complaints are not something I will be answering because they're not
relevant to the issue of habeas corpus.
"Unless you want me to respond to them, but I don't think they're relevant." (Tr VOL:2, P
23 L 11-25; P 24 L 1-2.)
The PWHC CLEARLY challenges arrest. (Tr VOL:2, P 11 L 24-25; P 12 L 1-2; P 24 L 8-20.)
The PWHC was sworn under oath before a notary, and it begins with this list. These challenges
to the arrest and incarceration were made: Windsor has not been charged with a crime within the
jurisdiction of the demanding states. (Argument #1 -R VOL:1, P 34 -36.) There has been no
complaint made against Windsor. (Argument #2 -R VOL:1, P 37.) Windsor is not a fugitive.
(Argument #3 -R VOL: 1, P 38 - 41.) Windsor has not been substantially charged with a crime.
(Argument #4 - R VOL: 1, P 42 - 43.) Ada County courts have failed to make timely
determinations regarding Windsor. (Argument #5 -R VOL:1, P 44 - 45. [Tr VOL:2, p.16 L 425.] Windsor has been denied his right to apply for a writ of habeas corpus. (Argument #6-R
VOL:1, P 46 - 49.) Windsor was being illegally held in the ACIJ. (Argument #7 -R VOL:l, P
50 - 52.) Windsor was denied bond. (Argument #8 - R VOL: 1, P 53 -057.) Windsor's property
was seized unlawfully. (Argument #9 -R VOL:1, P 58.) Windsor was subjected to cruel and
unusual punishment. (Argument #10-R VOL:1, P 59 - 61.) Windsor could not be identified as
the person allegedly charged with crimes in MT or TX. (Argument #11 -R VOL:1, P 62.)
186. ISSUE #21: Did Judge Steckel fail to address the issues in denying the PWHC?
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187. Yes. JDS cited Clark G. Kerr v. Rocky Watson, 649 P.2d 1234; 103 Idaho 478
(08/18/82) as the basis for his denial. (Tr VOL:2, P 24 L 8-25, P 25 L 1-25, P 26 L 1-24.) But
this cited case clearly applies to a PWHC challenging a GW:
"The governor of Oregon requested extradition of appellant to the state of Oregon. The
governor of Idaho complied with the request and issued an extradition warrant. These
proceedings ensued....
"Our power, as a court in a state whose governor has granted the extradition of a person
wanted in another state, is limited to deciding: (a) whether the extradition documents on
their face are in order; (b) whether the petitioner has been charged with a crime in the
demanding state; (c) whether the petitioner is the person named in the request for
extradition; and (d) whether the petitioner is a fugitive. Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282,
289, 99 S.Ct. 530,535, 58 L.Ed.2d 521 (1978)." (Clark G. Kerr v. Rocky Watson, 649 P.2d
1234; 103 Idaho 478 (08/18/82).)
188. Windsor's PWHC was not challenging a GW, so Kerr v. Watson does not apply.
189. JDS did not even address the factors detailed in LC. 19-4211.

190. ISSUE #22: Was Judge Steckel's denial of the PWHC not supported by the
evidence before the court?
191. Yes. It was not supported by any evidence. The only evidence before JDS was that
presented by Windsor.

192. ISSUE #23: Did Judge Steckel err by not ruling on whether Appellant was a
fugitive from Montana or Texas?
193. Yes. There is no court order making such a finding, and he did not address this vital
issue at the March 20, 2015 Hearing. (Tr VOL:2.) The only evidence before the court was that
Windsor was NOT a fugitive. [R VOL:1, P 000038 - 000041.]

194. ISSUE #24: Was the alleged Idaho Governor's Warrant insufficient?
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195. Yes. As Windsor was never served with an alleged ID GW, it was most definitely
insufficient. [Tr VOL:2, P 19.] [Tr VOL:2, P 24 L 8-13; P 8 L 18-23; P 22 L 19-25.] [Tr VOL:2,
P 14 L 19-22.]
196. None of the requirements ofl.C. 19-4510 were met after an ID GW was allegedly
received. (See State v. Waggoner, 1993, 124 Idaho 716, 864 P.2d 162.) [Tr VOL:2. p.22.]
197. ISSUE #25: Was documentation provided by the State of Montana insufficient for
extradition?
198. Yes. As Windsor was never served with an alleged ID GW, any MT documentation
was most definitely insufficient. [Tr VOL:2, P 19; P 24 L 8-13; P 8 L 18-23; P 22 L 19-25.]
199. If documentation from MT did not show that Windsor committed a crime in MT and
fled the state, it does not support the basis upon which he was held in the ACIJ for 35 days,
which was that he was a fugitive. If it did make such a claim, it was false.
200. Windsor believes any alleged ID GW will have inadequate and/or false affidavits.
Every affidavit and numerous statements made by prosecutors have been false. The MT Bench
Warrant documents are inadequate for false. The so-called affidavits of probable cause in FE15-02389 and FE-15-02390 are absolutely false.
201. If the MT documentation was nothing more than an affidavit from Missoula County
Attorney Kirsten Pabst, it is definitely insufficient as she has no knowledge of the facts and did
not even work for the County Attorney's Office when charges were filed against Windsor in MT.
202. If the MT documentation failed to identify and attach a protective order, it was
insufficient as Windsor has sworn that there is no protective order to have been violated. [Tr
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VOL:2, P 12 L 3-25; P 13 L 1-25; P 14 L 1-7.J Before a fugitive may be extradited, he must be
charged with a crime within the jurisdiction of the demanding state. (U.S. Constitution, Article 4,
Section 2; Balla v. State, 1977, 98 Idaho 344,563 P.2d 402.) [R VOL:l, P 000034 - 000036.)

Walton v. State, 1977, 98 Idaho 442,566 P.2d 765. [R VOL:l, P 000072.]
203. Is the charging affidavit couched simply in conclusory language? If so, it does not
constitute grounds for determining probable cause. Kinnaird v. State ( 1968), 251 Ind. 506, 242
N.E.2d 500. Were there factual affidavits to show knowledge of facts constituting the corpus
delicti of the offense? Were alleged facts known personally? If not, any affidavits cannot satisfy
federal constitutional requirements. Nathanson v. U.S. (1933), 290 U.S. 41, 54 S. Ct. 11, 78 L.
Ed. 159; Jones v. U.S. (1960), 362 U.S. 257, 80 S. Ct. 725, 4 L. Ed. 697. (John Lee Bailey v.

William M. Cox, 296 N.E.2d 422; 260 Ind. 448 (05/24/73).)
"An alleged fugitive may question the truth or sufficiency of the recitals in a rendition
warrant, or the authority of its issuance." (Fenton v. State, 1966, 91 Idaho 149, 417 P .2d

415.)
204. To be valid, the charging document must site the law allegedly violated in MT and
reasonably inform Windsor of the conduct asserted to represent the violation. (Proctor

v.

Skinner, 1982, 104 Idaho 426,659 P.2d 779.)
205. There likely are other deficiencies, but since Windsor was never given a copy, it is

impossible to speculate further.
206. ISSUE #26: Was the evidence insufficient to detain and deliver Windsor for trial
in another state?
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207. Yes. There is no evidence. [R VOL:1, P 000080.] See Smith v. State of Idaho, 1967,.
373 F.2d 149, cert denied, 87 S.Ct. 2139, 388 U.S. 919, 18 L.Ed. 2d 1364. [R VOL:1, P 000080.]
208. ISSUE #27: Did the State fail to provide evidence that Windsor was ever served
with a Warrant of any type?
209. Yes.
"In its petition, the State attaches a copy of a governor's warrant which issued on the 2d day
of June, 1976, and a sheriff's return showing that a copy of the same was served upon
Struve. The return, in all respects similar to a return of civil process, does not show or
suggest that Struve was arrested pursuant to the warrant. The petition does not suggest that
Struve, if arrested, was taken before a magistrate as required by both state and federal
statutes. Nor does the petition claim that the State of South Dakota continues to want Struve
returned." (Harry T. Struve v. Robert Wilcox, 579 P .2d 1188; 99 Idaho 205 (02/03/78).)
210. There is absolutely no warrant in evidence, much less documentation showing that
Windsor was arrested, served, or taken before a magistrate. [Tr VOL:2, P 24 L 8-13; P 8 L 1823; P 22 L 19-25.]
211. ISSUE #28: Was it an error by failing to grant a Writ or issue an order denying
the grant of a writ?
212. Yes. Nothing was ever issued.
"We note initially that habeas corpus, LC. § 19-4201, is the proper vehicle by which
extradition may be challenged. Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U.S. 80, 6 S.Ct. 291, 29 L.Ed. 544
(1885); Norton v. State, 93 Idaho 648,470 P.2d 413 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 936, 91
S.Ct. 918, 28 L.Ed.2d 215 (1971); In re Martz, 83 Idaho 72,357 P.2d 940 (1960). Here,
appellant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the district court. A writ was issued
to which the sheriff made a return. That return did not controvert any of the substantive
claims in the petition for the writ." (Larry L. Jacobsen v. State of Idaho, 577 P.2d 24; 99
Idaho 45 (03/30/78).)
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213. LC. 19-4211 requires that a "writ should issue without delay and a hearing should be
scheduled." This was not done.
214. ISSUE #29: Did Judge Steckel err by not giving Windsor the opportunity for
review of the alleged issuance of an Idaho Governor's Warrant?
215. Yes. Habeas corpus affords an opportunity for judicial review of the issuance of a GW,
i.e., to determine if the documents upon which the governor acted conformed to the statutory law
of the jurisdiction.
216. This is the law. See paragraphs 36-37.
217. ISSUE #30: Was Windsor denied procedural rights accorded by Idaho statute?
218. Yes. See paragraphs 57-111.
219. ISSUE #31: Should the relief requested in the petitions for writ of habeas corpus
have been granted?
220. Yes. Based upon the facts and the law, Windsor should have been released.
221. ISSUE #32: Are there special considerations in this matter that justify granting
this Appeal?
222. Yes. There is case law scattered around the country that indicates that once a GW is
served, that act erases all prior violations. There is no such statute. Those cases were nothing
like the instant matter where everything was violated repeatedly and then a crime was committed
in delivering Windsor to MT authorities when Ada County had no legal right to be holding him,
and it was done knowingly in violation of LC. 19-4511. Those cases were not cases where the
accused was denied filing of his PWHC for 16 days and an order was never issued and a hearing
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was never set. Those cases were not cases where the accused was never served with a GW from
the Demanding State. Those cases were not cases where there was no determination of probable
cause.
Since the record before our habeas Judge clearly established that no determination of
probable cause was made by any Judge or any other official who might qualify as a neutral
and detached magistrate, prior to the issuance of the extradition warrant by the Governor of
this State, or at any other time for that matter, appellant was entitled to a judgment of
discharge from custody." (John Lee Bailey v. William M. Cox, 296 N.E.2d 422; 260 Ind.
448 (05/24/73).)
223. So, if it is necessary to argue for a modification of "existing law," Windsor asks this
Court to declare that the State of ID cannot violate every rule in the book while repeatedly
violating the Constitutional rights of the accused. Windsor informed the judges and the
prosecuting attorney about the repeated violations, and they simply ignored him. They don't
care. They do whatever they want. And this Court is the only hope to establish a precedent to
say, "No more. We won't be Lawless Idaho. When we have laws, they need to be honored by
government officials because we darn sure expect citizens honor them."

CONCLUSION
"Authority of the State to protect citizens from illegal arrest or wrongful rendition must
never be forgotten." (U.S. Constitution, Article 4, Section 3, Clause 2; Walton v. State,
1977, 98 Idaho 442,566 P.2d 765.)
WHEREFORE, William M. Windsor prays that this Court:
a. order that William M. Windsor was illegally restrained in his liberty by the State of
Idaho;
b. order that William M. Windsor was illegally detained and incarcerated in the Ada
County Jail;
c. discharge the Appellant from any custody which ensued from his incarceration as of

February 20, 2015;
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d. order the delivery of William M. Windsor to the State of Montana was unlawful and
that the State of Idaho did not have jurisdiction to be holding William M. Windsor
much less delivering him to Montana;
e. order that William M. Windsor was unlawfully denied bail;
f. order that William M. Windsor was unlawfully denied discharge;
g. order that William M. Windsor was denied due process, denied adequate use of a law
library, denied filing of his PWHC, and denied action by a judge on the PWHC;
h. order that the bond was excessive;
1.
order that Ada County has violated the cruel and unusual punishments clause of the
Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution;
J. order that Ada County Idaho Judge Daniel Steckel violated William M. Windsor's
rights when he told him that his a PWHC challenging an Idaho Governor's Warrant
would not be heard; and
k. grant any other relief that this Court deems just and proper.
This 30th day of October 2015,

William M. Windsor

CERTIFICATION

I certify that I have reviewed the Brief and have concluded that every factual statement in
the Motion is supported by competent evidence included in the Record.
This 30th day of October 2015.

....,
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~---" ''
\ '---=---William M. Windsor

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I have mailed this Appellant's Briefto Fafa Aldijani, Ada County
Attorney, 200 West Front Street Room 3191, Boise, Idaho 83702
This 30th day of October 2015,

William M. Windsor
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